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Art is under no categorical imperative to correspond point by point
to the underlying tendencies of its age. Artists will do whatever they
can get away with, and what they can get away with is not to be
determined beforehand.'
-Clement Greenberg
I. INTRODUCTION

Artists pride themselves on coloring outside the lines. Throughout history, art
has progressively evolved from one movement to the next by artists taking
chances and breaking rules. In the past century, artists have exhibited this rulebreaking behavior by experimenting with ways to remove art from its traditional
forms and locations in unexpected ways.2 Site-specific art is one such product of
these pioneering artists. Unlike artists who create traditional paintings or
sculptures that stand alone and apart from their surroundings, site-specific artists
incorporate their own unique creation into the surrounding location so as to create
one complete work of art.3
Even as artists continue to find new ways to break the traditional rules of art,
those in the artistic community desire more legislative rules that would offer
greater protection for artists and their works.4 While Congress chose to exercise
its grant of constitutional authority to promote the useful arts by creating some
economic protection for artists under the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 Congress
declined to grant moral rights, such as the rights of integrity and attribution for
works of art.6 Eventually, after some hesitation, Congress passed the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) to specifically grant artists these moral rights
of attribution and integrity to their works of visual art.7

1 Clement Greenberg, AbstractArt, NATION, Apr. 15, 1944, at 450.

2 See FRED S. KLEINER ET AL., GARDNER's ART THROUGH THE AGES 1099 (1 1th ed. 2001)

(discussing site-specific art with pop and surrealism because "these artists insisted on moving art
out of the rarefied atmosphere of museums and galleries and into the public sphere").
' See id. at 1099-1103 (examining several well-known examples of site-specific and
environmental artworks).
' See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006) (detailing arguments
by sculptor for protection of site-specific art under state and federal legislation); Kelley v. Chicago
Park District, No. 04-C-07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008) (discussing an
artist who argues that his nontraditional works of art should be granted moral rights protection from
destruction or removal).

5 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000).
6 SeeJeff C. Schneider, Recent# EnactedFederalLegslation ProvidingMoralRights to VisualArtists:
A CricalAna.sis,43 FLA. L. REv. 101, 102-03 (1991) (observing that traditionally the American
legal system only allowed artists to retain the right to exploit the economic value of their work).
7 See Joseph Zuber, The VisualArtists RightsAct of 1990-What It Does, and What It Preempts, 23
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While VARA seems to grant moral rights protection for all visual artists, recent
court decisions have made clear that site-specific art is not protected by this
statute.' In determining why site-specific art is being treated separately and
differently from other works of visual art, one should look to the competing
interests of the owner of the private property on which the art sits and of the
public that are unique to this form of visual art. Implied in these courts'
evaluations of the relationship between site-specific art and VARA are the weighty
interests of the private owner and the public in the creation and removal of works
of site-specific art balanced against the rights of integrity and attribution of the
artist.9 In the unique situation of site-specific art, these courts' decisions have
implied that an artist's moral rights can be trumped by the competing interests of
0
others in the conmunity.'
Because moral rights protection for artists helps promote the useful arts in this
country, it is important that new and innovative forms of art, like site-specific art,
are not excluded from this type of legislative protection. However, it is also
important to balance the competing interests of the private owner and the public
in granting such protective rights. Thus, site-specific artists, while not protected
by VARA, deserve certain limited moral rights as to their work in order to better
promote the progress of useful arts. This Note addresses the need for new
legislation that would grant certain limited moral rights for site-specific artists
while balancing the unique countervailing interests of private owners and the
public.
First, this Note will explore the defining characteristics, development, and
thematic elements of site-specific art. Additionally, the competing interests
implicated in site-specific art, such as those of the artist, the private owner, and the
public, will be illuminated using the controversial site-specific work of art, the
TiltedArc, as an example.

PAc. L.J. 445, 473 (1992) (stating that VARA was passed in 1990 and put into effect in 1991).
' See, e.g., Phil'ps,459 F.3d at 143 (concluding that VARA does not apply to site-specific art);
Kelky, 2008 WL 4449886, at *1 (holding that a finding of site-specificity is sufficient to remove the
protections of VARA from a work of visual art).
" See Phillps,459 F.3d at 142 (noting that extending VARA to site-specific art could impact real
property interests of private owners); Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6 (following the persuasive
reasoning of Philips).
1o See Philps, 459 F.3d at 129 (holding that VARA does not apply to site-specific art and
allowing the art to be removed by the property owner); Kelley, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6 (following
the court's reasoning in Phillips).
n See KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1102-03 (examining the rise and fall of the Tilted Arr);
PATRICIA HILLS, MODERN ART IN THE USA:

ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES OF THE 20TH

CENTURY 442-45 (2001) (discussing the controversy surrounding the TiltedArc).
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Second, this Note will examine the historical background of VARA. The
works covered by, rights conferred by, and exceptions from this federal statute will
be explained next.
Third, the current case law on site-specific art and VARA, Phillps v. Pembroke
Real Estate, Inc.,12 will be analyzed. After a brief background of this case, the
arguments of the artist and analyses of the district court and circuit court will be
examined. Also, the commentary and reaction as well as the influence and
significance of this case will be explored, including its impact on the most recent
case involving site-specific art and VARA, Kelley v. Chicago Park District.3
Finally, in light of this background, the need for new legislation conferring
certain limited moral rights to site-specific artists will be explored. This analysis
will start with the proposition that the Phillps court was correct in holding that a
finding of site-specificity is sufficient to remove a work of art from the protections
of VARA. Building on this conclusion that site-specific art is not currently
afforded moral rights protection, the analysis will then present and examine several
compelling reasons why site-specific artists should be granted such rights. Finally,
due to the unique nature of site-specific art and the competing interests that are
involved, the analysis concludes that new and narrowly-tailored legislation is
needed to sufficiently balance these interests against the moral rights of sitespecific artists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SITE-SPECIFIC ART

1. Defining Characteristics. According to the Guggenheim Museum of modern
and contemporary international art,
Site-specific or Environmental art refers to an artist's intervention
in a specific locale, creating a work that is integrated with its
surroundings and that explores its relationship to the topography of
its locale, whether indoors or out, urban, desert, marine, or
otherwise .... Site-specific art is meant to become part of its locale,
and to restructure the viewer's conceptual and perceptual experience
of that locale through the artist's intervention. 4

12

459 F.3d at 128.

" 2008 WL 4449886 at *1.
14 Guggenheim Museum, Site-specific art/Environmental art, http://www.guggenheimcoUect

ion.org/site/movement-works Site_specific_.arEnvironmentalart_0.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2009).
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Thus, site-specific art involves more than just the physical creation of the artist;
the artist is striving to create a relationship between his artistic creation and its
surroundings."5
When artists incorporate their creation within natural
surroundings, the work is often referred to as environmental art. 16 Site-specific
work, on the other hand, is created when artists incorporate their creation with any
surrounding, whether it be a public area or privately owned property. 7
2. Development. Site-specific art developed as a part of a much larger art
movement in the late twentieth century known as postmodernism. 8 As its name
implies, postmodernism was a direct reaction to modernism, which was the
prevailing art movement for most of the twentieth century. 9 While the definition
of modernism fluctuated throughout the twentieth century, the term "modernism"
generally encompasses the art concepts and techniques of the time.2 ° While such
a definition of modernism may seem self-evident, it inevitably leads one to ask,
how can anything be postmodern? Art historians explain that postmodern art is
anything that flouts the rules of modernism."' Although such an explanation is
not very precise, neither is postmodernism itself. Art historians posit that
"postmodernism's ability to accommodate seemingly everything in art makes it
extremely difficult to provide a clear and concrete definition of the term. '
Nevertheless, although postmodernism itself is difficult to define, art historians
clearly identify site-specific art and its predecessor, environmental art, as being
included in this broad art movement.23
Environmental art developed in the 1960s, a decade in American history which
saw an overwhelming increase in awareness and concern for environmental
protection and preservation.2 4 As a part of this increased environmental
awareness, environmental artists used their artwork to highlight the inherent
beauty of nature.25 Environmental artists created man-made objects that were
typically very large in scale and seamlessly incorporated these objects into natural

15Rachel E. Nordby, Off ofthe
Pedestaland into the Fire:How PhillipsChips away at the
Rights of SiteSpecific Arists, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 167, 171 (2007).
16 KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1099.
17See id. at 1102 (discussing works that call attention to art's
role in public spaces, rather than
the environment).
18See HILLS, supra note 11, at 338-39, 433-36, 442-45 (discussing site-specific art, also known
as public art, as a development of postmodern art in public spaces from the 1980s to 1990s).
19See id.at xvi (describing modernism as the "reigning phenomenon of the twentieth century").
20 Id

21 KLEINER ET AL.,
22

supra note 2, at 1075.

Id.

' See id.
at 1099-1103 (discussing environmental and site-specific art as a subset of postmodern

art).
24 Id. at 1099.
25 Id.
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surroundings.26 However, contrary to the environmental artists' motive to raise
environmental awareness, their works of environmental art were often located in
very isolated areas with little access to the general public, which limited the
influence and impact of their art.'
Seizing on the overall idea of environmental art to use artwork to call attention
to its surroundings, rather than just the work of art itself, site-specific artists began
to incorporate their creations into city squares and other very public places. 8 Art
in public spaces was not a new concept, as statues, sculptures, and murals have
been placed in public areas for centuries. 29 However, site-specific artists did not
merely place their art in any area where it could be viewed, but rather chose a
particular location so as to incorporate the surroundings and even the public into
their work of art, in order to call attention to "art's role in public places." '3
3. Thematic Elements. Site-specific artists, while exploring a new and innovative
approach to the purpose of art, still emphasize several very traditional American
themes in their pursuit.3' Site-specific artists focus on the commonplace, which
is a theme found throughout American art.32 Another traditional American theme
emphasized by site-specific artists is the social dimension of art-making.33 By
combining this social awareness with a focus on the commonplace, site-specific
artists have taken on 34the social responsibility of making art available to and about
the common person.
4. Competing Interests. The creation of public art, and specifically site-specific
art, is in some ways much more challenging than other more traditional forms of
art because of the various competing interests involved. 35 Not only are the
interests of the artist and the private owner of the property at stake, but most
notably, the public has a strong interest in what is arguably being created for
them.36 Often, these interests are in conflict, as was illustrated in the creation and
ultimate removal of the infamous TiltedAr. The Tilted Arc, created by Richard
Serra and commissioned by the General Services Administration, was a curved

26 See id. at 1099-1102 (describing examples of site-specific art integrated into natural
environments).
27

Id. at 1099-1100.

' See id at 1102 (highlighting the placement of art in public places).
29 HILLS, supra note 11, at 433-36.
'o KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1102.
31 See HILLS, supra note 11, at xvii (discussing, in general, themes that recur throughout
American art, of which site-specific art is a subcategory).
32

Id.

33 Id
34 Id
35 See KLE]NER ET AL., smpra note 2, at 1103 (discussing

the inherent problems of public art,
including the competing rights and responsibilities of the artist and the public).
36 Id.
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steel wall that created a twelve foot high, 120 foot long partition across the plaza
in front of the Jacob K. Javits Federal Building in New York City.37 Using this
controversial work of art as an example, the interests of the artist, the private
owner, and the public in the creation and control of site-specific art will be
explored.
a. Interests of the Arlist. As the creator of the site-specific work of art, the
artist has an interest in creating something that draws attention to and is
inseparable from its surroundings. 8 The artist also has an interest in the integrity
of his work, such as protection from its destruction or modification. 39 The
concept of destruction is vastly expanded for a site-specific artist, as the artist
believes that removal of the piece of work from its location destroys the work of
art itself.' Thus, a site-specific artist has an interest in the permanency of his
work in the location for which the work of art was created.4'
For example, when Richard Serra created the Tilted Arc, he wanted to
"dislocate or alter the decorative function of the plaza and actively bring people
into the sculpture's context."'4 2 Therefore, to him, any removal of the structure
would be to destroy it because the sculpture had been specifically designed for the
Federal Plaza in New York City. 3 Thus, the artist not only has an interest in the
creation of the work, but also in the integrity, duration, location, and permanency
of the work once created.'
b. Interests ofthe Private Owner. The private owner of the property on which
the site-specific art is located also has unique interests in the work of art. 4 First,
the owner may have an interest in creating something unique and beautiful for the
location.' Second, the owner may have an interest in removing the work of art
for a variety of reasons, whether it be a change of taste or a new vision for the

17

I.at 1102.

" See id.
at 1103 (discussing the purpose of site-specific art as being the ability of the artist to
call attention to the role of art in public areas).
31 See id.
(noting that artists believe they have a right to their work being "uncensored, respected,
and tolerated, although deemed abhorrent, perceived as challenging, or experienced as threatening"
(citing Calvin Tomkins, TheArt World TitleAr, NEWYORKER, May 20, 1985, at 98)).
' HILLS, supra note 11, at 443.
41 I.

Tomkins, supra note 39, at 100.
43HIttS, supra note 11, at 442.
4 See, e.g., i. at 442-43 (discussing Serra's interest in creating and protecting the TiltedArc).
45 See, e.g., KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1102-03 (discussing the role of the General Services
Administration in the commission and removal of the TiltedArc).
12

46Id.
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property.47 Thus, the private owner has an interest in being able to control what
is and is not on the property at any given time, regardless of his reason.
In the case of the Tilted Arc, the commissioner of the work of art was the
General Services Administration, which is a federal agency that oversees the
selection and installation of artworks for government buildings. 4 The TiltedArc
was installed in the plaza in front of the Jacob K. Javits Federal Building in New
York City. 49 However, upon public outcry, the General Services Administration
5°
was forced to reconsider its decision to commission the TiltedArc
and thus had
an interest in being able to remove the work of art should it decide to do so. In
conclusion, the private owner of the property has an interest, in general, of being
able to control the property, whether that be the ability to commission or to
remove works of art.
c. Interests ofthe Public. Because of the unique nature of site-specific art and
the artist's desire to bring art to the people, the public often has a strong interest
in this type of artwork."1 The public's interest includes being involved in the
decision to commission works of art that would affect them or, in the same
regard, having a voice in the decision to remove or not remove the work of art.52
As for the Tilted Arc, the public had a strong aversion to the twelve-foothigh, 120 foot long, curved wall that dissected a previously open plaza in front of
this federal building.53 Many people felt that the TiltedArc was not aesthetically
pleasing and was impractical in its location.' The public also felt it had no input
into the creation of this work of art and therefore some viewed it as a symbol of
the government's dominance over them."5 Thus, because of the nature of sitespecific art, the public has a strong interest in being able to have input into the
creation and removal of works of 5art
that are designed for them and affect their
6
everyday lives and gathering areas.

41 See, e.g., id. (discussing the General Services Administration's decision to remove the TiltedArc
due to public protests and petitions).
48 Id. at 1102.
49 Id.

'o Id. at 1103.
51 See, e.g., HILLS, supranote 11, at 442-45 (discussing Richard Serra's desire to incorporate the
public in his site-specific work of art and the public's strong aversion to the TiltedAr).
52 See id. (pointing out that one of the main issues coming to the forefront in the 1980s was the
demand by the public to be included in different arenas of decision making).
" KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1102-03.
-'4 Id. at 1103.
55 HILLS, supra note 11, at 444 (stating the opponents of the Titkd Ar complained that the
decision making process for commissioning the work was "entirely in the hands of government
bureaucrats").
56 See, e.g., KLEINER ET AL., supranote 2, at 1102-03 (discussing the public's role in the ultimate
removal of the TiltedArc).
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d. Balandng the Interests. Obviously, these interests can easily conflict with
each other, as was the case with the TiltedArc.57 Thus, the interests of the artist,
the private owner, and the public must be balanced in order to either create a
meaningful and lasting work of site-specific art or to find a solution when that
plan goes awry."8 In the end of the TiltedArc debacle, the government bowed to
the public interest and removed the steel wall, despite vehement protests by the
artist, who claimed that removal of the sculpture was destruction of his work. 9
As a result of this contentious situation, the General Services Administration now
solicits input from the public before commissioning public art.6° In that instance,
the interests of the public outweighed those of the artist and influenced those of
the private owner.6' However, VARA was not enacted at the time.62 Would the
outcome have been different under this federal legislation?
Some legal commentators have pointed out that the dispute over the TiltedArc
was well known to the legislators drafting and voting on VARA and that because
this legislation does not explicitly identify site-specific art as being protected, the
federal legislation was not intended to grant artists like Richard Serra any rights
over those of the private owner and public. 63 Perhaps it is impossible to know
how the TiltedArc issue would have been litigated under VARA, but more recent
controversies involving site-specific art have shed light on the emphasis that
courts, when interpreting VARA, will place on the competing interests of the
artist, the private owner, and the public.' 4
B.

VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

1. HistoricalBackground.While the protection of moral rights for visual artists
may be a product of the twentieth century, it is also the fruit of a seed planted
hundreds of years ago in the United States Constitution." Article I, Section 8

" See id. (examining the controversy over the TiltedArc and the roles that the private owner, the
artist, and the public played).
'8 See, e.g., id. (reviewing the issues that arose from the TiltedArc mishap).
9 Id at 1103.
60 Id
61 Id.
62 See Zuber, supra note 7, at 472-73 (explaining that VARA was passed in 1990 and put into

effect in 1991).
63 See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cit. 2006) (recognizing the
district court's inference that Congress declined to include site-specific art in VARA, as Congress
was aware of the TiltedAr controversy when the legislation was passed).
64 See Phillips, 459 F.3d at 143 (holding that VARA does not cover works of site-specific art);
Kelley v. Chicago Park District, No. 04-C-07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,2008)
(following the reasoning of the Phillips court).
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to promote the useful arts via
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grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' While this enumerated power would
allow Congress to protect moral rights of artists should it so choose, until recently,
Congress chose only to promote the arts through economic protection for artists
under the Copyright Act of 1976.67
This approach lagged behind those taken by other countries, especially France,
68
which protected not only economic rights but also the moral rights of artists.
These moral rights include "the right to create, the right of disclosure, the right to
withdraw, the right to claim authorship, and the right to preserve the work from
any alterations, mutilations, or modifications. 69
In 1987, an attempt was made by Representative Edward J. Markey and
Senator Edward M. Kennedy to pass legislation that would protect these moral
rights for artists in the United States.7" However, Congress failed to pass the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987."' Then, in what some thought would be a
definite step toward moral rights protection for artists, the United States adopted
the Berne Convention for the Proliferation of Literature and Art in 1988.72 This
reciprocal copyright treaty requires that each signatory recognize the moral rights
of its authors.73 However, Congress initially hesitated to pass legislation protecting
artists' moral rights, asserting that previously enacted legislation already protected
these rights.74 Congress may have been referencing "the law of copyright, the
doctrine of waste, defamation, unfair competition, contract law, and invasion of
privacy" to argue that the United States had sufficient moral rights protection.7"
Nevertheless, these theories arguably fall very short of protecting moral rights of
artists."

legislation).
66 Id.
67 See Schneider, supra note 6 (observing that traditionally, the American legal system only
allowed artists to retain the right to exploit the economic value of their work).
See Jill R. Applebaum, Note, The VisualArtists Ri'ghts Act of 1990: An Anaysis Based on the
French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 183-86 (1992) (discussing the developed moral
rights protection in France as compared to the lack thereof in the United States).
69 Schneider, supra note 6, at 103 (citations omitted).
0 Zuber, supra note 7, at 470-71.
71 Id at 471.
72 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified as amended in scattered sections of tide 17 of the U.S.C.).
73 Id

"4Timothy M. Case, Note, The VisualAristsRghtsAct, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85,91

(1991).
" Id. (citations omitted).
76 Id
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Recognizing this shortfall, Representative Markey and Representative Robert
Kastenmeier introduced H.R. 2690, entitled the Visual Artist Rights Act of 1989,
on June 20,1989.7 While Senator Kennedy had also introduced a nearly identical
bill in the Senate on June 16, 1989, H.R. 2690 was passed by the Senate and
the House on October 27, 1990, and then signed by President Bush on
December 1, 1990.8 Thus, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 was enacted as
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, and took effect on June 1, 1991.7
2. Works Covered. The protections of VARA extend only to works of visual
art.' Congress has defined a work of visual art as a painting, drawing, print,
sculpture, or still photograph, subject to certain limitations.8' For example, the
work of visual art must either be a single copy or a limited edition.82 To constitute
a limited edition, there must be 200 or fewer copies of the work of visual art that
are signed and consecutively numbered by the author." Explicitly excluded from
the definition of a work of visual art are posters, maps, globes, charts, technical
drawings, diagrams, models, applied art, motion pictures or other audiovisual
works, books, magazines, newspapers, periodicals, databases, electronic
information services, electronic publications, merchandising items or advertising,
promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging materials or containers.8" Also
excluded from works of visual art are works made for hire, which include works
prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment or works specially
ordered for use as a contribution to a collective work. 5
3. Rights Conferred. VARA grants the creators of works of visual art, as defined
above, the moral rights of attribution and integrity to their works." Under VARA,
an artist who creates a work of visual art has the right of attribution "to claim
authorship of that work, and to prevent the use of his or her name as the author
of any work of visual art which he or she did not create."87 Also, the artist has
"the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual
art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 8

7 Zuber, supra note 7, at 472.
78 Id.at 472-73.
79Id.
at 473.
oVisual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
8, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
82 Id
83 id
84 id.
85

Id.

8

Id.§ 106A.

87 Id

8 Id
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Additionally, subject to certain limitations, an artist of a work of visual art has
the right of integrity "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation" and "to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature." 9
The limitations on this right involve a work of visual art that was created prior to
VARA, which cannot be removed from a building without its destruction." In
such a case, these specific rights included in VARA do not apply.9'
Finally, there is a time limitation on the moral rights conferred by VARA.92
Works of visual art that were created on or after VARA was effectuated are
protected for the lifetime of the artist.93
4. Exceptions. The rights conferred by VARA are also subject to several
exceptions.94 First, "the modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification."9 Additionally, "the modification of a work of
visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the public presentation,
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification... unless the modification is caused by gross
negligence."96 This is more commonly referred to as the public presentation
exception and has been of great importance in the litigation involving site-specific
works of art so far.97
C. PHILIPS V. PEMBROKE REAL ESTATE, INC.

1. Background. David Phillips is an artist nationally recognized for his work
with stone and bronze, which he integrates into the surrounding environment.9 s
Phillips's works can be seen at universities and public spaces across the United
States and internationally.99 Like a true environmental and site-specific artist,

9 Id.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2000).
91 Id.
92

Id.§ 106A(d).

93

Id.

94 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
95Id
96 Id.
9'See, e.g., Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 131 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing
the district court's in-depth analysis of the public presentation exception as applied to site-specific
art).
9 Id.at 129.
" Id.at 130.
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Phillips proclaims that it is his "inherent reverence for natural beauty in this
''
ecologically ravaged world that influences all his decisions. 0
In 1999, Pembroke Real Estate, Inc. (Pembroke) commissioned Phillips and
three other artists to work on Eastport Park located in Boston. 1° Pembroke is the
lessee of the land on which the park is built, which is situated across from the
Boston Harbor in the South Boston Waterfront District.0 2 The park is free and
open to the public twenty-four hours a day.'03 Phillips and the three other artists
created a sculptural park with a nautical theme to match the waterfront locale. 4
Phillips's work in the park is extensive. He had an agreement with the
landscape architect to be the artist that coordinated with the landscape
specialists.0 5 Phillips helped design a series of repeated spirals that run along a
diagonal axis of the park as a part of this agreement. 6 Phillips also contracted
with Pembroke to create twenty-seven sculptures for the park, including fifteen
abstract bronze works.'0 7 Another contract with Pembroke required Phillips to
design and install stonework, including stone walls and granite walkways.0
Phillips also carved from granite the centerpiece for the park, a large spherical
sculpture, Chords." Despite the fact that Phillips's work throughout the park is
extensive and diverse in nature, his work is "unified by a theme of spiral and
circular forms."" 0
In 2001, Pembroke wanted to redesign the park: simplify walkways, include
more plants for shade, remove stone that caused maintenance problems, and
remove and relocate some of Phillips's sculptures."' Phillips objected to
Pembroke's original redesign plans to remove his stonework and relocate his
sculptures." 2 In 2003, Pembroke revised its plan and agreed to retain all but one
of Phillips's sculptures, but still relocate some of the stone and change the
walkways." 3 Even with the changes in his favor, Phillips was not satisfied with
Pembroke's redesign plans and filed suit." 4

10o Id.

101Id.
102

Id.

103

Id.

105

id.
Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

104

"' Id. at 130-31.
109Id. at 131.
110

Id.

"I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 id
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2. District Court. Phillips sued Pembroke in federal district court, seeking
injunctive relief under VARA and a similar state statute."' After a nonevidentiary
hearing on August 21, 2003, the court issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent Pembroke from changing the park." 6 Pembroke then returned to its first
redesign plan to remove nearly all of Phillips's sculptures." 7 The court then
conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing." 8
a. Arguments ofArist DatidPhilps. In his suit against Pembroke, Phillips
sought "to prevent Pembroke from altering, moving, or modifying any of his work
inthe [park in any way."" 9 Phillips's first argument to the district court involved
the site-specific nature of his works in the park. Phillips argued that his sculptures
and stonework constituted site-specific works of art because they were designed
for and inseparable from the park.' Phillips also argued that VARA protected
these site-specific works from any alteration, which would include any relocation
Phillips also addressed the public
or removal of the site-specific works.'
that
the removal of his site-specific art
arguing
presentation exception of VARA,
22
did not fall within this exception.
Phillips's second argument to the district court involved his works as one large
integrated piece.'2 3 As an integrated work of art, Phillips argued, the removal of
any one of the pieces would harm the larger work and therefore violate VARA.' 24
As a last resort, Phillips was also willing to argue that the entire park was a single
work of integrated art protected by VARA.'"
b. Anaysis. In addressing Phillips's site-specific arguments, the district
court found that most of his work in the park was site-specific.1 6 The court
determined that Phillips "used the harborside location [of the park] as one
The court then
medium of his art," thus making it site-specific to the park.
looked to case law and decided that the public presentation exception excluded
site-specific works from the protections of VARA.12 " Here, the court referenced

115Id.(citing the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, which the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial

Court determined did not include protection for site-specific art).
116

Id.

117 Id.
118

Id

119 Id

at 134.

120Id

at 135.

121

Id.

122

Id.
id
Id

123
124

'2
127

Id.
Id at
Id

128

See id at 138 (concluding that Congress did not intend for VARA to protect site-specific art

125

137.
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the widely-publicized dispute over the TiltedArc as evidence that Congress was
aware of site-specific art when it did not explicitly include it in the provisions of
VARA. 12 9 Thus, the district court concluded that "an artist has no right to the
placement or public presentation of his sculpture," even site-specific work, under
VARA's public presentation exception."3
The district court also addressed the issue of whether Phillips's twenty-seven
sculptures, or in the alternative the entire park, constituted a single integrated work
of art.'
The court looked to case law and legislative history to determine if
VARA recognized integrated works of art as works of visual art.'32 The district
court decided that VARA did recognize integrated art as a work of visual art.'33
The court also found that most of Phillips's pieces in the park made up a work of
integrated art, but that some were free-standing pieces of sculpture. "3 The works
that the court identified as making up an integrated work of visual art were those
located on a diagonal axis across the park, tied together by a spiral theme.'35
Other nautical-themed sculptures not located on this axis were determined to be
separate from the integrated work.'36 The court went on to reject Phillips's last
resort argument that the park itself was one integrated work of art.'37 The court
did not, however, decide that a park could never be a work of visual art under
VARA, leaving that question open for future litigation.'38 Yet, though it
concluded that VARA did apply to integrated art and that Phillips had created a
work of integrated art, the court decided that VARA did not prevent the removal
of the work
from the park because of the public presentation exception of
139
VARA.

After the two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that although
most of Phillips's work was one integrated work of visual art, he had no right to
the placement or public presentation of it under the exception found in VARA.'"
The district court issued a memorandum and order in which it found that if

because VARA and the public presentation exception were enacted after the highly publicized Tilted
Arc controversy).
'" Id; see also Serra v. U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
removal of site-specific artwork did not violate an artist's right of free expression or due process).
130Phil4s,459 F.3d at 138.
131
132

Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.

133 Id.

134Id. at 136-37.
131Id. at 136.
136 Id.

137Id at 137.
138 Id.
139

id.

140 Id at 131.
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Pembroke did not alter, modify, or destroy the works of visual art, it could move
Phillips' work from the park without violating VARA. 14' Thus, the district court
held that the free-standing works could be relocated and the integrated work of
art could be "disassembled and moved piecemeal," as long as individual pieces
were not altered or destroyed. 42
3. CircuitCourt.
a. AgumentsofAristDaidPhiIps.On appeal, Phillips contended that the
district court misinterpreted the language and legislative history of the public
presentation exception.14 1 Phillips argued that the public presentation exception
of VARA does not apply to site-specific art and removal of such art is
prohibited.'" Phillips claimed that the words "presentation" and "placement" are
indefinite as to location, arguing that "placement" indicates something
temporary. 14 Phillips invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, arguing that the
words of the statute should be read in the context of the words around them.'"
Therefore, according to Phillips, the words "placement" and "lighting" must be
read as related to each other, indicating a meaning of non-permanent changes in
public presentation.'
Additionally, Phillips argued that the words of VARA
mean one thing as applied to non-site-specific art and another as applied to sitespecific art. 148 He claimed that the silence of the statute on site-specific art is
evidence that site-specific art is covered. 49
b. Anaysis. The circuit court rejected Phillips's arguments on appeal and
modified the holding of the district court."1s The court held that site-specific art
does not fall into the public presentation exception of VARA because the Act
does not apply to site-specific art at all.'
The court concluded that the plain
language of VARA did not include protection of moral rights for site-specific
art.' 52 Disagreeing with the district court, the circuit court concluded that VARA
could not protect site-specific art and then allow its destruction by removal and
relocation pursuant to the public presentation exception. 15 3 These variances of
opinion hinge on the courts' interpretations of what is destruction of site-specific

141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id. at
Id at
Id at
Id at
Id. at

131-32.
139.
140.
140-41.
141.

Id
146Id.
(claiming
147

that VARA has a "dual regime').

Id.at 142.
150Id.at 143.
149

151 Id.
152
153

id
Id.
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work."s While the district court determined that destruction would only occur if
the individual pieces were damaged during removal, the circuit court, agreeing
with Phillips ironically, found that removal of site-specific work from a particular
location was destruction as the surroundings are an integral part of the work.'
Thus, instead of creating a site-specific exception to VARA when none was
explicitly mentioned, the court held that site-specific work was not covered by
VARA at all."56 The court, noting the tensions between the interests of the artist
and the private owner that would be created should the protections of VARA
extend to site-specific art observed that, "[o]nce a piece of art is considered sitespecific, and protected by VARA, such objects could not be altered by the
property owner absent consent of the artist[, and s]uch a conclusion could
dramatically affect real property interests and laws."'5 7 The court ended its
opinion by suggesting that if moral rights protection should be granted to sitespecific art it is a job for the5 8 legislature: "If such a protection is necessary,
Congress should do the job.')
4. Commentary and Reaction. William Patry, a copyright lawyer with an online
159
blog, agreed with the result of Phillips's case but not the circuit court's analysis.
In a posting titled "The First Circuit Misses the Boat Again," Patry asserts that the
issue was incorrectly framed by the circuit court.) 6 While the circuit court framed
the issue as whether or not VARA recognizes site-specific art and therefore
protects it, Patry claims that the issue was really whether VARA grants the right
to prevent the removal of the work, even if the work is not physically destroyed,
because removal itself is destruction."' Patry argues that VARA does not protect
mere removal and points to the Tilted Arc controversy and its influence on the
formulation of VARA as support. 6 Donn Zaretsky notes in another blog the
harm Phillips's suit may have on the future claims of artists, especially those of
site-specific works.'63 Whereas previously site-specific artists could use the threat
of suing under VARA as leverage in a negotiation of the removal of their work,
that threat is obviously much less effective post-Phillps.'6

'" See id. at 140 (discussing the illogical conclusion of the district court that removal of works
of site-specific art was not destruction of those works).

155 Id.
156

'
1s8
159

Id. at 142-43.

Id at 142.
Id at 143.
The Patry Copyright Blog, http://wiliampatry.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 22, 2006, 15:14 EST).

160 Id.
161

Id.

Id.
The Art Law Blog, http://thearlawblog.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 24, 2006, 19:50 EST).
164 Ia
162
163
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5. Impact and Significance. Within the year following Phillps, another case
involving a different form of site-specific art commenced. 6 In Kelly v. Chicago
Park District, artist Chapman Kelley installed a work of art known as Wildflower
66
Works in Chicago's Grant Park pursuant to a permit from the city of Chicago.'
Wildflower Works consisted of two very large elliptical forms filled with wildflowers,
which Kelley replanted and tended to throughout the year.' 67 Chicago renewed
the permit for a period of ten years spanning from the installation in 1984
until 1994.168 After 1994, Kelley continued replanting and tending his Wildflower
Works pursuant to an oral permit renewal. 6 9 This continued for ten years as well,
until the Chicago Park District concluded that Wildflower Works would need to be
reconfigured for maintenance and park expansion purposes in 2004.1'7 The Park
District approached Kelley with its plans to reduce and reshape Wildflower Works
in order to solicit his input but did not to seek his approval.'' Kelley disapproved
of the plans, but the Park District went forward with them and reduced Wildflower
Works to less than half its previous size and changed its form from ellipses to
rectilinear shapes.'
Kelley then sued the Chicago Park District in federal court, alleging a violation
of VARA, copyright infringement, and other various state law claims.' 73 In order
to be covered by the protections of VARA, Kelley asserted that Wildflower Works
is a work of visual art.'74 Kelley argued that Wildflower Works is either a painting
or a sculpture, thus constituting a work of visual art."'
In evaluating Kelley's argument that his work of flowers is either a painting or
a sculpture, the court noted that neither term was defined by Congress in the
Copyright Act. 7 6 The court appropriately observed that, absent a statutory
definition, words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.' 7 However,
the court also noted that "[t]here is a tension between the law and the evolution
of ideas in modern or avant garde art; the former requires legislatures to
taxonomize artistic creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the
See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04-C-07715, 2008 WL 4449886 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 29, 2008).
166Id.at *1.
16

167

id.

168 Id.at *2.
169
170
171
172

Id
Id at *3.
id
Id.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
175 Id.
176 Id at *4.
'7 Id.
173
174
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definition of what we accept to be art."' 78 Thus, the plain and ordinary meanings
of modern art terms are often difficult to discern in the legal context.
The Chicago Park District argued for the application of a bright line rule that
any artifact that "changes over time, requires ongoing maintenance, or contains
living matter" cannot be considered a work of visual art.'79 However, the court
declined to follow this path of reasoning." 8 After referring to several accepted
works of art that change over time, the court refused to determine that an
arrangement of living plants can never be a work of visual art per se.' 8'
The court began to evaluate Kelley's claim that Wildflower Works was a
sculpture by looking to the dictionary meaning of sculpture and testimony offered
by Kelley's expert witness, a fine art appraiser and professor of art history at New
York University.8 2 The court then determined that Kelley's "manipulation of the
flowers, metal, and gravel into an elliptical shape" fit within the broadest definition
of sculpture. 8 3 Again, in evaluating Kelley's claim that Wildflower Works was a
painting, the court looked to the dictionary definition of painting and testimony
offered by the expert witness.1"' Using these sources for guidance, the court
determined that the oval swatches of wildflowers in bloom could be considered
15
a painting. 8
Although the court determined that Wildflower Works was a work of visual art
as either a sculpture or painting, the court went on to decide that Wildflower Works
was not copyrightable.'" Nevertheless, for argument's sake, the court addressed
the possibility that had Wildflower Works been copyrightable, it still would not have
been protected under VARA because it was site-specific.'87 The court determined
that Kelley's work was site-specific based on expert testimony and admissions by
the artist.'
The court found that "the theoretical concepts that motivated
Kelley's design and placement of Wildflower Works required that it be placed in
Grant Park [because] Kelley wanted a location that would create a contrast
between the linearity of the urban grid, the rondure of the elliptical gardens, and
the entropy of the wildflower beds."'8 9 Indeed, before choosing the Park, Kelley

178Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.

181Id.

"8Id at *5.
Id
184 Id.
183

185

Id.

"6
18

Id. at *6.
Id (citing the Phillipsdecision as support).
Id at *7.

188

189 Id.
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surveyed Chicago from the air via airplane and helicopter to find a location that
would appropriately express his artistic vision.' 90 Also, Kelley incorporated
preexisting elements of the environment into Wildflower Works, such as air vents,
that became figurative elements in the finished work itself. 9 Thus the court
concluded that Wildflower Works was site-specific.'92
The court, like the circuit court in Phillps,observed that VARA is silent on the
issue of site-specific art. 19 3 Noting that there are few published decisions on
VARA and that no court in its circuit had dealt with the issue of VARA's coverage
of site-specific art, the court decided to follow the persuasive reasoning set forth
by the First Circuit in Phillips.9 4 Thus, the court held that Kelley's Wildflower
Works could not be protectable under VARA, even if it was copyrightable, for the
sole reason that it was site-specific to Grant Park. 9
III. ANALYSIS
A. FINDING OF SITE-SPECIFICITY SUFFICIENT FOR VARA EXCLUSION

As Phillipsand Kelly clearly indicate, the position of the law as to site-specific
works of art and VARA today is that a finding of site-specificity is sufficient to
completely remove the work of art from the moral rights protection of the
statute. 96 The courts' consensus of the rule, however, does not mean that it is
necessarily the correct or appropriate one. In fact, there are at least three possible
critiques of this rule. First, the courts may have correctly interpreted the statute
as applied to site-specific artists and therefore developed a sound legal rule.
Second, this rule may be legally incorrect and site-specific artists do have moral
rights protection under VARA. Third, this rule may be a correct legal
interpretation of the current statute, but the law should be changed so as to
accommodate site-specific artists. This Note approaches the issue of moral rights
for site-specific artists from this last assessment of the current state of law. A
finding of site-specificity is sufficient to remove the work of art from the moral
rights protections of VARA' 97 However, site-specific artists should be afforded
some moral rights protection. In light of the fact that a site-specific work of art
implicates the interests of not only the artist, but also those of the private owner

190Id.
191Id.
192 Id
193 id
194 Id.
195 Id.

196 See supra notes 151-58, 187-95 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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and the public, 98 new legislation should be adopted to appropriately balance the
rights and responsibilities of these three interest groups.
The proposition that new moral rights legislation for site-specific artists is
necessary presumes the court's holding that VARA does not apply to site-specific
art is correct. As a matter of legislative intent, there is evidence that Congress was
aware of site-specific art through the controversy over the TiltedArc and yet did
not specifically address site-specific art in VARA. 19 9 Such evidence would go to
the proposition that Congress did not intend for VARA to provide moral rights
protection for site-specific artists. Further, as a matter of statutory construction
and application, the Philipscourt properly identified the irony in the district court's
finding that VARA recognizes site-specific art and yet allows its destruction
through the public presentation exception."
Thus, as the Phillps court
recognized, either VARA recognizes site-specific art and protects it in its location,
or VARA provides no recognition or protection for this unique type of artwork.2"
As previously discussed, protecting site-specific works of art in their location
would infringe on the interests of both private owners and the public. 202 Thus, the
Phillscourt is correct in holding that VARA does not protect site-specific works
of art in any way.
B. MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR SITE-SPECIFIC ART

While the Phillps court may have correctly answered the question of whether
VARA grants moral rights protection to site-specific artists, the court did not
explicitly answer the question of whether site-specific artists should be granted
moral rights protection. There are hints, however, that the Phillpscourt felt that
its hands were tied because it did not have the ability to grant moral rights under
current legislation. 3 Regardless of what the Phillips court did or did not indicate,
site-specific artists should be granted moral rights protection for several reasons.
First, site-specific works of art are works of visual art, and works of visual art, with

19' See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
200

See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.

201 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
202 See supra Part II.A.4.b-c.

" See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cit. 2006) ('We do not
denigrate the value or importance of site-specific art, which unmistakably enriches our culture and
the beauty of our public spaces. We have simply concluded, for all of the reasons stated, that the
plain language of VARA does not protect site-specific art. If such protection is necessary, Congress
should do the job. We cannot do it by rewriting the statute in the guise of statutory
interpretation.").
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few expressly stated exceptions, have been granted moral rights protection. 2°4 A
work of visual art is statutorily defined as a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or
still photograph. 2° Site-specific works of art are often defined as sculptures of
some sort. From the more traditional sculptures found in Phillps to the
arrangement of flowers in Kely, the courts did not have any issue in defining these
site-specific works of art as works of visual art.2' Through VARA, Congress has
deemed moral rights protection appropriate for works of visual art. 7 Therefore,
as works of visual art, site-specific works of art should also be granted moral rights
protection.
Second, granting moral rights protection to site-specific works of art is
important in promoting the development of public art, which can be beneficial to
all parties involved, including the artist, the private owner, and the public. Even
the Phillps court recognized the benefits that site-specific art can give: "Wedo not
denigrate the value or importance of site-specific art, which unmistakably enriches
our culture and the beauty of our public spaces.""
Site-specific art can
undoubtedly serve many important interests in society, including promoting an
awareness
of art among individuals who may never step foot in a museum or
9
gallery.

2

0

Finally, granting moral rights to site-specific artists is an important legislative
step in not only protecting the art forms of today but also in fostering creativity
for the future. Even the United States Constitution recognizes the importance of
promoting art by granting Congress the power to legislate protection for authors
and creators.21 ° For Congress to simply limit protection to those art forms that
neatly fall into traditional and easily-definable categories would be to stymie the
very purpose of this enumerated power. Art will only continue to grow and
change in unanticipated ways and the law should be flexible and dynamic enough
to promote and protect the creative innovations of the future.
While site-specific artists should be granted moral rights protection for the
reasons discussed above, there are several competing factors which should limit
the rights granted to such artists. These factors include the interests of the private
owner and the public. Because site-specific works of art implicate the interests of
these two groups more than other types of visual art, the current legislation is
inadequate to allow courts to balance these interests against the rights of the artist.
However, with new legislation that is composed specifically for the unique
204See sapra Part II.B.2-4.
" Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See supra notes 126-27, 182-85 and accompanying text.
207 See supra Part II.B.2.
Philips,459 F.3d at 143.
See KLEINER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1102.
210 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
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situation of site-specific art and adequately balances the competing interests of the
public and private owner with the rights of the artist, there simply is not a
significant countervailing reason why moral rights should not be granted to sitespecific artists.
C. A LEGISLATIVE FIX: ADOPTING SARA (SITE-SPECIFIC ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT)

Seizing on the parting words of the Phillipscourt, Congress should do the job
and grant moral rights protection for site-specific artists. However, as artists
continue to find new ways to break old rules, legislators are faced with the difficult
task of writing legislation that will continue to offer protection for the artists. This
is a challenging task not just because of the ever-evolving nature of art, but also
because of the conflicting interests implicated by offering artistic protection,
especially to site-specific artists. For site-specific art, the interests of the artist, the
private owner, and the public will often conflict with one another. Thus,
legislators must appropriately balance the need for artistic protection for sitespecific artists with the interests of the private owner and the public. Enactment
of a Site-Specific Artists Rights Act (SARA) could effectively accomplish the dual
goal of protecting the rights of site-specific artists and ensuring representation of
private and public interests.
Picturing what such balancing legislation would look like is difficult. The
legislature must first handle the issue of how much of the moral rights protection
for visual artists should be granted to site-specific artists. There are obvious
difficulties in this decision, as the very nature of site-specific art requires that it be
protected in its location. Other works of visual art are subjected to the public
presentation exception of VARA, which gives the artists no right as to how or
where their works are displayed. In order to truly protect site-specific art, the
legislature must allow site-specific artists some rights in how and where their
works are displayed.
Such a grant of rights to the artist, however, brings up the next issue the
legislature must handle: what rights will the private owner be able to retain over
his own property as against the rights of the artist in the placement of his sitespecific work of art? As the Phillps court aptly noted, "[o]nce a piece of art is
considered site-specific, and protected by VARA, such objects could not be
altered by the property owner absent consent of the artist[, which] could
'
Obviously VARA was illdramatically affect real property interests and laws."211
equipped to handle the conflict arising between the recognition of the artist's right
to the placement of his work and the private owner's right to control his own

211 Philips, 459 F.3d at 142.
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property and the objects thereon. Thus, any new legislation that Congress writes
to protect site-specific art must retain important safeguards for the private owner.
Otherwise, private owners would be discouraged from commissioning site-specific
works of art-which can be of great benefit to the public at large--out of fear that
they would lose control of and rights to their own property. An example of such
a safeguard would be a time limit on the artist's right to the location of his work
of art, which upon expiration would allow the private owner to remove the work
of art from his property. Another safeguard for the private owner could be a
buyout option, which would allow the private owner to purchase the work of art
or the rights to its location for a preset price from the artist, regardless of the
artist's desire to sell. While these safeguards do in fact infringe on the moral rights
of the artist, which this Note have argued are necessary, such infringements on the
rights of site-specific artists are better than no rights at all, which is the present
state of the law.
Finally, legislators must determine what rights, if any, the public should have
as against the moral rights of the artist or even the property rights of the private
owner. As the Tilted Arc situation demonstrated, the public can be a powerful
influence even without legislatively-granted rights. Therefore, while certain rights
may need to be granted to the private owner as against the artist in order to
incentivize the development and creation of site-specific works, the public may
not need to be granted statutory rights as against the private owner or the artist,
as its influence over both parties (but particularly the private owner) is already
strong.
The above are just a few examples of how Congress could balance these
competing interests while still granting moral rights protection for site-specific
artists. Clearly such interests are unique to site-specific art. Therefore any
legislation that is written must be narrowly tailored to the interests specifically
involved with the creation and preservation of this type of art. While the details
of how Congress can achieve this balancing between the artist, the private owner,
and the public are difficult to determine, one thing is fairly easy to decide: moral
rights protection for site-specific artists needs to be granted by Congress and the
adoption of SARA could provide much needed protection for this unique art
form.
IV. CONCLUSION

Site-specific art, which is the product of the incorporation of an artist's
creation into its surrounding environment, developed as a way to allow the public
to experience and interact with art in their everyday lives. By taking their artworks
out of museums and galleries and into the wide-open world, site-specific artists
invited the public to enjoy and become a part of their creation. Thus, by invitation
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from the artist, the public plays an integral role in the creation of site-specific art.
.Additionally, by design, site-specific art is inseparable from its location as the
surrounding environment is a part of the artwork. Thus, the private owner of the
property on which the art is located also plays an integral role in the development
and duration of site-specific art. These interests-those of the public and the
private owner--coupled with the interest of the artist in the creation and duration
of his unique work of art are all integral to site-specific art, yet they rarely align and
often conflict with one another as the TiltedArc debacle clearly illustrates. In that
instance, the artist's interest in protecting his work from destruction by removal
was outweighed by the public's unfavorable opinion of his artwork and the private
owner's decision to remove the site-specific work. However, when Congress
enacted VARA, visual artists received moral rights protection for their works,
providing site-specific artists with the hope that the interests of the public and
private owner would no longer trump the artist's interest in the integrity of his
work.
Unfortunately, in Phillps v. Pembroke RealEstate,Inc., the First Circuit stamped
out the hope of site-specific artists by finding that VARA does not apply to sitespecific works of art at all. Thus, the private owners of the park where the
artworks at issue in the case were located were free to move the site-specific
works, even though such removal would destroy the works of art as they were
designed specifically for that location. The detrimental impact of the decision in
Phillpswas recently augmented when a district court decided to follow the First
Circuit's reasoning and found that VARA does not apply to site-specific art, even
though it is a form of visual art. Although the results of these cases are
unfavorable to site-specific artists, the finding that VARA does not apply to sitespecific artists is defensible. Because site-specific art implicates the competing
interests of the public, the private owner, and the artist in ways that more
traditional forms of visual art do not, VARA is not sufficiently tailored to the
unique issues surrounding site-specific artists and their works.
Although VARA does not provide moral rights protection for site-specific
artists, these artists should be granted such protection for several reasons. First,
site-specific art is a form of visual art and Congress, by enacting VARA, has
placed its stamp of approval on granting moral rights protection for works of
visual art. Although the courts have decided that site-specific art is not covered
by VARA, the courts were still able to define both the site-specific sculptures in
Phillps and the site-specific display of flowers in Kelley as works of visual art.
Thus, as works of visual art, site-specific works should receive moral rights
protection. Second, moral rights protection for site-specific art will help promote
the development of public art, which provides both cultural and educational
benefits for society. Individuals who never step foot in a museum have the
opportunity to experience art in their everyday lives through site-specific artworks.
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Finally, adopting moral rights legislation for site-specific art will aid in promoting
progressive art forms and fostering creativity, which is in step with the
Constitution's grant of power to Congress to promote the useful arts.
Site-specific artists were certainly thinking outside the box of traditional art
techniques and forums when they pioneered a new form of artistic expression that
incorporated handcrafted works of art into their surrounding environment. For
legislators to try and fit these creative and ambitious works into a one-size-fits-all
box of legal protection for visual artists would be disastrous for both the art world
and the community at large. To effectively protect the moral rights of site-specific
artists while simultaneously protecting the interests of the property owner and
public that are implicated by site-specific art, the legislature must adopt legislation
that is specifically tailored to this unique art form. By adopting SARA, Congress
can effectively protect this unique form of art without encroaching on established
property rights of private owners or dismissing the public interest. In order to
effectively balance these interests, the legislation could set a time limit on the
artist's moral rights that is much shorter than the lifetime limit granted by VARA
or give property owners a buyout option, which could include the right to
purchase th site-specific work of art or the rights to its location. Such narrowly
tailored provisions would allow the SARA to accomplish the goal of granting
moral rights protection for these artists without overstepping the important
interests asserted by private owners and the public.
In short, site-specific artists, as creators of works of visual art, should receive
moral rights protection. Enacting a SARA can effectively protect the moral rights
of these artists without disregarding the important interests of the private owner
and public. Although Phillps has left VARA little protection for site-specific
artists, Congress should use its constitutional power to promote the useful arts by
providing moral rights for these specific visual artists.

Lauren Ruth Sports
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